PRACTICAL TOOLS FOR YOUR MORAL TOOLKIT: A LEADERSHIP GUIDE TO GROUP ETHICAL BEHAVIOR by McCarey, Eamonn J.
Calhoun: The NPS Institutional Archive
DSpace Repository
Theses and Dissertations 1. Thesis and Dissertation Collection, all items
2019-12
PRACTICAL TOOLS FOR YOUR MORAL
TOOLKIT: A LEADERSHIP GUIDE TO GROUP
ETHICAL BEHAVIOR
McCarey, Eamonn J.
Monterey, CA; Naval Postgraduate School
http://hdl.handle.net/10945/64022
This publication is a work of the U.S. Government as defined in Title 17, United
States Code, Section 101. Copyright protection is not available for this work in the
United States.








PRACTICAL TOOLS FOR YOUR MORAL TOOLKIT: 
A LEADERSHIP GUIDE TO 
GROUP ETHICAL BEHAVIOR 
by 
Eamonn J. McCarey 
December 2019 
Thesis Advisor: Bradley J. Strawser 
Second Reader: Matthew R. Zefferman 
 
Approved for public release. Distribution is unlimited. 
THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
 REPORT DOCUMENTATION PAGE  Form Approved OMB No. 0704-0188 
 Public reporting burden for this collection of information is estimated to average 1 hour per response, including the time for reviewing 
instruction, searching existing data sources, gathering and maintaining the data needed, and completing and reviewing the collection of 
information.  Send comments regarding this burden estimate or any other aspect of this collection of information, including 
suggestions for reducing this burden, to Washington headquarters Services, Directorate for Information Operations and Reports, 1215 
Jefferson Davis Highway, Suite 1204, Arlington, VA 22202-4302, and to the Office of Management and Budget, Paperwork Reduction 
Project (0704-0188) Washington, DC 20503. 
 1. AGENCY USE ONLY 
(Leave blank)  
2. REPORT DATE 
 December 2019  
3. REPORT TYPE AND DATES COVERED 
 Master's thesis 
 4. TITLE AND SUBTITLE 
PRACTICAL TOOLS FOR YOUR MORAL TOOLKIT: A LEADERSHIP 
GUIDE TO GROUP ETHICAL BEHAVIOR 
 5. FUNDING NUMBERS 
 
  
 6. AUTHOR(S) Eamonn J. McCarey 
 7. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES) 
Naval Postgraduate School 
Monterey, CA 93943-5000 
 8. PERFORMING 
ORGANIZATION REPORT 
NUMBER 
 9. SPONSORING / MONITORING AGENCY NAME(S) AND 
ADDRESS(ES) 
N/A 
 10. SPONSORING / 
MONITORING AGENCY 
REPORT NUMBER 
 11. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES The views expressed in this thesis are those of the author and do not reflect the 
official policy or position of the Department of Defense or the U.S. Government. 
 12a. DISTRIBUTION / AVAILABILITY STATEMENT 
Approved for public release. Distribution is unlimited.  
12b. DISTRIBUTION CODE 
 A 
13. ABSTRACT (maximum 200 words)     
 In 2018, the Congressional Research Service (CRS) published a report indicating that the U.S. Congress 
has a growing concern over misconduct, ethics, and professionalism within the United States Special 
Operations Command (USSOCOM). This thesis used these concerns as a starting block to answer a much 
broader question of how leaders can promote an ethical culture within their respective organization. 
Answering this question was accomplished by employing a qualitative literature review in the fields of 
evolutionary theory and moral psychology. This research first applied evolutionary thinking to assess how 
we form, define, and maintain morality at the individual and group levels in order to articulate what 
relationships, norms, and heuristics we use to determine our appropriate behavior. Second, it used the 
research in moral psychology to analyze how we develop our moral judgments and take action upon those 
judgments, and effective ways leaders can motivate our moral intuitions and reasoning. Provided in the 
conclusion is a qualitative list of recommendations leaders can implement at both the personal and 
organization policy levels using a pluralist moral framework. Although these recommendations are limited 
to the research explained throughout this thesis, the execution of these actions by a well-respected influential 
leader can have a strong impact in shaping the moral community they serve. 
 14. SUBJECT TERMS 
Congressional Research Service (CRS), United States Special Operation Command 
(USSOCOM), ethics, morality, professionalism, evolutionary theory, moral psychology, 
leadership, ethical change 
 15. NUMBER OF 
PAGES 
 81 
 16. PRICE CODE 




 18. SECURITY 
CLASSIFICATION OF THIS 
PAGE 
Unclassified 








NSN 7540-01-280-5500 Standard Form 298 (Rev. 2-89) 
Prescribed by ANSI Std. 239-18 
i 
THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
ii 
Approved for public release. Distribution is unlimited. 
PRACTICAL TOOLS FOR YOUR MORAL TOOLKIT: 
A LEADERSHIP GUIDE TO GROUP ETHICAL BEHAVIOR 
Eamonn J. McCarey 
Lieutenant, United States Navy 
BS, U.S. Naval Academy, 2014 
Submitted in partial fulfillment of the 
requirements for the degree of 
MASTER OF SCIENCE IN DEFENSE ANALYSIS  
(IRREGULAR WARFARE) 
from the 
NAVAL POSTGRADUATE SCHOOL 
December 2019 
Approved by: Bradley J. Strawser 
 Advisor 
 Matthew R. Zefferman 
 Second Reader 
 Kalev I. Sepp 
 Chair, Department of Defense Analysis 
iii 
THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
iv 
ABSTRACT 
 In 2018, the Congressional Research Service (CRS) published a report indicating 
that the U.S. Congress has a growing concern over misconduct, ethics, and 
professionalism within the United States Special Operations Command (USSOCOM). 
This thesis used these concerns as a starting block to answer a much broader question of 
how leaders can promote an ethical culture within their respective organization. 
Answering this question was accomplished by employing a qualitative literature review 
in the fields of evolutionary theory and moral psychology. This research first applied 
evolutionary thinking to assess how we form, define, and maintain morality at the 
individual and group levels in order to articulate what relationships, norms, and heuristics 
we use to determine our appropriate behavior. Second, it used the research in moral 
psychology to analyze how we develop our moral judgments and take action upon those 
judgments, and effective ways leaders can motivate our moral intuitions and reasoning. 
Provided in the conclusion is a qualitative list of recommendations leaders can implement 
at both the personal and organization policy levels using a pluralist moral framework. 
Although these recommendations are limited to the research explained throughout this 
thesis, the execution of these actions by a well-respected influential leader can have a 
strong impact in shaping the moral community they serve. 
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In 2018, the Congressional Research Service (CRS) published a report indicating 
that the U.S. Congress has a growing concern over misconduct, ethics, and professionalism 
within the United States Special Operations Command (USSOCOM). From this report, 
Congress mandated that the Secretary of Defense must conduct a comprehensive study of 
the ethical and professional programs within USSOCOM while providing tools and metrics 
for assessing these programs.1 This thesis uses these concerns as a starting block to answer 
a much broader question of how leaders can promote an ethical culture within their 
respective organizations.  
Using a cross-discipline qualitative study into the fields of evolutionary theory and 
moral psychology, this thesis provides a list of recommendations at both the individual and 
group levels to ways in which leaders can encourage an ethical organizational environment. 
The application of evolutionary theory assesses how we form, define, and maintain 
morality from the social and environmental pressures of our deep evolutionary past. By 
analyzing the ethnographies of hunter-gatherer tribes, this thesis evaluates common 
characteristics of what we may consider our universal sense of morality. The study of moral 
psychology provides depth into our understanding of morality, how we form our moral 
judgements, and the actions we take upon those judgments. From the research in these 
disciplines, the findings indicate that:  
1. Due to the Dunbar number, our ability to truly evaluate the character and 
reputation of members within our moral community is limited to 150 
interpersonal relationships.2 Members must be constantly shifted into 
different positions and locations to continue this evaluation process in order 
to maintain accountability of the organization’s moral consensus.  
________________________ 
1 Andrew Feickert, U.S. Special Operations Forces (SOF): Background and Issues for Congress, CRS 
Report RS21048 (Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, 2019), 
https://crsreports.congress.gov/product/pdf/RS/RS21048 
2 R. I. M. Dunbar, “The Social Brain: Mind, Language, and Society in Evolutionary Perspective,” 
Annual Review of Anthropology 32 (2003): 172. 
xii 
2. Individuals should be evaluated and promoted for the attributes of a leader 
in a hunter-gatherer society. The “mismatch hypothesis” explains that our 
psychologies and physiologies are more accustomed to the Pleistocene 
environment over our modern environment.3 Leaders should be chosen by 
their achieved authority through consensus building, acts of indirect 
reciprocity, and observed dedication to serving the betterment of the 
organization and the members involved.4  
3. Because our morality is practically applied in pluralistic fashion, moral 
dilemmas are a real thing, and they are often a conflict of interest between 
our five different moral foundations.5 Once again, following the ‘mismatch 
hypothesis’, leaders must encourage the most prestigious member to invite 
a dialogue where the group evaluates the context and circumstance in which 
one foundation outweighs another through group consensus building.  
In conclusion, this research was designed to understand how to foster an ethical 
organization within the context of the ingroup. Further research will need to examine the 
ethical principles an organization should emulate given the context of the modern 
environment and the demands that different stakeholders weigh to determine the 






3 Norman P. Li, Mark van Vugt, and Stephen M. Colarelli, “The Evolutionary Mismatch Hypothesis: 
Implications for Psychological Science,” Current Directions in Psychological Science 27, no. 1 (2018): 38–
44, https://doi.org/10.1177/0963721417731378. 
4 Christopher von Rueden and Mark van Vugt, “Leadership in Small-Scale Societies: Some 
Implications for Theory, Research, and Practice,” The Leadership Quarterly 26, no. 6 (December 2015): 
978, https://doi.org/10.1016/j.leaqua.2015.10.004. 
5 Jonathan Haidt, The Righteous Mind: Why Good People Are Divided by Politics and Religion. New 
York: Vintage Books, 2012. 
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In October of 2018, the Congressional Research Service (CRS) published a report 
indicating that the U.S. Congress has a growing concern over the misconduct, ethics, and 
professionalism within USSOCOM (United States Special Operations Command).1 From 
this report, Congress mandated that the Secretary of Defense must conduct a 
comprehensive study of the ethical and professional programs within USSOCOM while 
providing tools and metrics of assessing these programs.2 The CRS has defined these 
professional programs as providing the “training, education, initiative or other activities 
that focuses on values, ethics, standards, code of conduct, and skills as related to the 
military profession.”3  This is to ensure that all members adhere to the compliance of the 
rules and regulations provided by the UCMJ (Uniform Code of Military Justice) and uphold 
ethical principles that inform leaders when the rules are not clear.4 Assistant Secretary of 
Defense, Owen West, and Commander of USSSOCOM, General Raymond Thomas, have 
also indicated their interest in this report. They are curious to find if there are systemic 
problems within USSOCOM that have led to recent violations in ethical standards and if 
there are policy measures that must implemented to hold leaders and individuals more 
accountable.5 It is in their belief these recent incidents have the potential to “erode morale 
of our force, confidence of our allies and partners, and the moral authority of American 
values.”6 These leaders believe that USSOCOM is recognized not only in its ability to 
execute special missions that require elite skills and tactics, but also in its capacity to 
 
1 Andrew Feickert, U.S. Special Operations Forces (SOF): Background and Issues for Congress, CRS 
Report RS21048 (Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, 2019), 
https://crsreports.congress.gov/product/pdf/RS/RS21048. 
2 Feickert, 9. 
3 Feickert, 9. 
4 Feickert., 9. 
5 U.S. Congress. Senate, United States Special Operations Command and United States Cyber 
Command: Hearing before the Senate Armed Services Committee, Senate, 116th Cong., 1st sess., February 
14, 2019, https://www.armed-services.senate.gov/hearings/19-02-14-united-states-special-operations-
command-and-united-states-cyber-command. 
6 U.S. Congress. Senate, 8. 
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remain one of the most highly trusted professions in the United States.7 Therefore, the 
value of a discussion on ethical leadership and organizational culture is more prevalent 
now than ever.  
As the CRS finding will provide their own recommendations, I will not be focusing 
on the policy measures USSOCOM plans to implement to develop their moral community. 
Instead, this thesis will dive into the questions of what it means to be an ethical human and 
organization, and how leaders influence their members to adhere to these ethical standards. 
I will use quantitative and qualitative research in the disciplines of evolutionary theory and 
moral psychology to answer these questions. First, the purpose of using evolutionary theory 
is to understand how our distant hunter-gatherer ancestors lived, socialized, organized, and 
thought in the context of their “tribe.’” As evolutionary psychology argues that 98 percent 
of our homo related ancestry lived and died under the African savannah, they believe the 
majority of our brains’ development occurred under such conditions.8 Therefore, it is in 
their belief that “the mind is shaped by the pressure to survive and reproduce; emotions, 
communication skills and language ability are adaptations that enabled our ancestors to 
thrive. Often how people react and interact with one another is spelled out in our DNA.”9 
We are all decedents of those that were successful at navigating these challenges of group 
living. By understanding the challenges our ancestors faced, we can come to better terms 
on how leaders should ethically act when it comes to the betterment of their people and the 
success of the organization. Second, I will use the discipline of moral psychology to grasp 
a deeper understanding of our human decision-making processes in ethical terms. Moral 
psychology is an interdisciplinary field that takes aspects of both philosophical theories 
and psychology to observe and analyze human thought and behavior in an ethical 
7 Niall McCarthy, “America’s Most And Least Trusted Professions [Infographic],” Forbes, January 4, 
2018, https://www.forbes.com/sites/niallmccarthy/2018/01/04/americas-most-and-least-trusted-professions-
infographic/. 
8 “Evolutionary Psychology,” Psychology Today, accessed March 3, 2019, https://
www.psychologytoday.com/basics/evolutionary-psychology. 
9 “Evolutionary Psychology.” 
3 
context.10 In this thesis, I will dissect the problem of moral influence into the categories of 
how we make moral judgements, how we act upon those judgements, and what tools we 
can use to motivate individuals into moral action. Finally, at the conclusion of this thesis, 
I will summarize the main points provided by each theory into a comprehensive set of 
actions leaders can implement at both the personal and organizational level to foster the 
moral community they desire. I hope that this cross-discipline thesis will provide new and 
creative ways for leaders to engage their organization’s ethical behavior in a positive 
manner.  
10 John Doris et al., “Moral Psychology: Empirical Approaches,” in The Stanford Encyclopedia of 
Philosophy, ed. Edward N. Zalta, Winter 2017 (Stanford, CA: Metaphysics Research Lab, Stanford 
University, 2017), https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2017/entries/moral-psych-emp/. 
4 
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II. EVOLUTIONARY THEORY 
To understand how evolutionary theory will help us promote ethical leadership 
within our organizations, I will analyze humans at both the individual and organizational 
levels. I divide this chapter into these two categories. Although these two categories do not 
include all the different social organizations we find ourselves in, I will treat these two 
categories as the fundamental building blocks of what it means to be human. The 
importance of this divide is to show that morality is both an internal individual experience 
and a social group experience. Both weigh in how we articulate what morality is. This 
chapter will use the various fields of psychology, anthropology, and cognitive science that 
apply evolutionary thinking to assess how we form, define, and maintain our morality 
within a group. By explaining morality in these terms, we will have a better understanding 
of what human biases are at play, and what practical actions leaders can make to create the 
ethical culture they aspire to uphold. Although this chapter will end with an explanation of 
what leaders can do to influence their organization’s moral compass, once again, final 
recommendations will be provided in the last chapter with the combined suggestions from 
evolutionary theory and moral psychology. For the context of this chapter, morality is 
“concerned with the principles or rules of right conduct or the distinction between right 
and wrong”11 of an individual or group behavior within a social organization. A deeper 
framework of explaining morality will be defined in the moral psychology chapter. 
A. THE ENVIRONMENT OF EVOLUTIONARY ADAPTEDNESS AND THE 
NATURALISTIC FALLACY 
Before I discuss how humans form morality at both the individual and group level, 
I must first explain the concept of the environment of evolutionary adaptedness (EEA) and 
the notion of the naturalistic fallacy. EEA is a popular theory among evolutionary 
psychologists that refers to a composite of selection pressures that were responsible for 
shaping an adaptation over deep evolutionary time. Although EEA is not describing a 
 
11 “Definition of Morals,” in Dictionary.Com, accessed July 30, 2019, 
https://www.dictionary.com/browse/morals. 
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specific time table, every adaptation has a period of evolution that is unique in its 
development or design.12 It is hypothesized that many of our unique physical, social, and 
interpersonal adaptations that have made us distinctly human occurred from our last 
common ancestor with other living hominids, to the anatomically modern human prior to 
the agriculture revolution. This is time-lapse of over five million years of our evolutionary 
history. Based on this hypothesis, it is argued that because 99% of our existence as 
distinctly human occurred before the advent of agriculture and the domestication of 
animals, most “human preferences and behavioral decision making algorithms are adapted 
to the EEA and not necessarily the modern environment.”13 Although the EEA is a highly 
debated subject within the field evolutionary thinking, proponents of the theory understand 
that not all human behavior can be explained by our ancestral past. In the words of the 
prominent anthropologist Christopher Boehm, evolutionary theory recognizes that 
although  
culture is partly blind habit, it also involves people solving problems. 
Because so much of social life is flexibly constructed in light of conscious 
community needs and objectives, it should come as no surprise that as local 
environments change, people will be deliberately and insightfully 
modifying their practices to fulfill their needs as they see them.14 
Whether one agrees with the concept of the EEA or not, the significance here is that 
we must not ignore the impact our ancestral environment has had on our physiology and 
psychology. Therefore, the focus of this thesis is not to create a reductionist argument by 
ignore the importance of culture in influencing our perceived and actual sense of morality, 
but to analyze what all human cultures from our ancestral past have in common, and 
thereby attempt to find a universal sense of human morality.  
 
12 David Buss, Evolutionary Psychology: The New Science of the Mind, 6th ed. (New York: Taylor and 
Francis Group, 2019), 35. 
13 Kevin Bennett, “Environment of Evolutionary Adaptedness (EEA),” in Encyclopedia of Personality 
and Individual Differences, ed. Virgil Zeigler-Hill and Todd K. Shackelford (Cham: Springer International 
Publishing, 2018), 1–3, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-28099-8_1627-1. 
14 Christopher Boehm, Moral Origins: The Evolution of Virtue, Altruism, and Shame (New York: 
Basic Books, 2012), 267. 
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Finally, some scholars may argue that using evolutionarily derived judgments to 
evaluate moral judgments is committing the naturalistic fallacy.15 This fallacy is the idea 
that “it is illegitimate to move from a claim about the way something is to a claim about 
the way it ought to be.”16 Therefore, it is a highly debated subject as to whether to use 
evolutionary literature in the service of moral psychology and philosophy.17 For the 
purpose of this thesis, that discussion is beyond our analysis. However, to speak on the 
matter, I will respect the following premise: that the use of evolutionary science in this 
thesis will not commit this fallacy, first, by refraining from prescribing what our morality 
should be based on this science, and second, by using this field of academia as an evaluative 
tool to provide moral philosophers, psychologists, and the reader a way to decipher how 
best to create our moral community. The philosopher William Lewis promotes the use of 
evolutionary literature in the service of moral philosophy in arguing that by studying “the 
evolutionary mechanisms by which ethical judgments are produced will allow us, in a 
naturalist and pragmatist fashion, to better understand the possibilities for achieving ethical 
goals.”18 Therefore, in other words, if we understand why evolution promoted an adapted 
ethical conscious within our species, we should be able to hack this sense of morality and 
filter it to the service of our individual and organizational ethical goals. With that 
addressed, we will now draw our attention to literature of our evolved moral conscious.  
B. THE INDIVIDUAL CONSCIOUSNESS  
The first step in understanding how leaders can promote ethical decision making is 
to understand how humans form and define morality from an evolutionary psychological 
perspective. Evolutionary psychology is the study of the human mind under a unifying 
theoretical framework that explores: why the human mind is designed the way it is; how 
 
15 William S. Lewis, “Evolutionary Psychology in the Service of Moral Philosophy: A Possible Future 
for Ethics?,” Journal of Speculative Philosophy 25, no. 1 (2011): 54, https://doi.org/10.1353/jsp.2011.0006. 
16 Lewis, 54. 
17 Alex Walter, “The Anti-Naturalistic Fallacy: Evolutionary Moral Psychology and the Insistence of 
Brute Facts,” Evolutionary Psychology 4, no. 1 (2006): 33–48, 
https://doi.org/10.1177/147470490600400102. 
18 Lewis, 49. 
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the mind is designed; what is the mind designed to do; and how does environmental input 
interact with this design to produce an observable behavior.19 What makes evolutionary 
psychology a unique subfield of psychology is that it begins from the premise that our 
minds are designed to solve adaptive problems in our more distant hunter-gatherer past. It 
argues that all “human cognition, emotions, and behavior to be products of psychological 
mechanisms that evolved to solve recurrent survival and reproduction challenges in 
ancestral environments.”20 Therefore, any human emotion and behavior is a proximate 
mechanism that serves as a survival or reproductive tool. It is important to note that this 
does not need to be a conscious process (as most are not) to have been selected for and 
passed on through successive generations.21 This key part of this theory is often 
misunderstood by the general public. However, the alternate hypothesis can rightfully 
argue that “the evolutionary process also produces by-products as well as residue of noise” 
that do not solve adaptive problems and are functionless. A human physiological example 
can be the male nipple. As evolutionary scientists differ in opinion as to what we should 
regard as an adaptation, by-product, or noise, that dispute is beyond our intellectual 
engagement in this thesis.22 Instead, we will follow the logic of evolutionary psychology 
and explain this field’s belief in discovering potential adaptations that have produced our 
sense of morality. 
Thus, following this logic, we expect humans, like all living organisms, to hold 
different reproductive and survival “interests” and to act upon those “interests” in a 
behaviorally self-serving manner.23 This behavior is self-serving toward the gene (also 
 
19 David Buss, Evolutionary Psychology: The New Science of the Mind, 5th ed. (London: Routledge, 
2016), 3. 
20 Norman P. Li, Mark van Vugt, and Stephen M. Colarelli, “The Evolutionary Mismatch Hypothesis: 
Implications for Psychological Science,” Current Directions in Psychological Science 27, no. 1 (2018): 38–
44, https://doi.org/10.1177/0963721417731378. 
21 Azar Gat, “Why War? Motivations for Fighting in the Human State of Nature,” in Mind the Gap: 
Tracing the Origins of Human Universals, ed. Peter M. Kappeler and Joan B. Silk (Heidelberg: Springer 
Berlin Heidelberg, 2010), 208, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-02725-3_9. 
22 David Buss et al., “Adaptations, Exaptations and Spandrels,” American Psychologist 53, no. 5 
(1998): 533–48. 
23 Richard D. Alexander, “A Biological Interpretation of Moral Systems,” Zygon 20, no. 1 (March 
1985): 5–6, https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-9744.1985.tb00574.x. 
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referred to as inclusive fitness). Inclusive fitness is an important theory through which 
biologists understand and explain altruism in nature. As described by Hamilton’s Rule, an 
organism can evolve to act altruistically “if the fitness cost (C) to the donor is less than the 
fitness benefit (B) to the recipient, discounted by the coefficient of relatedness (r).”24  
(rC > B) The coefficient of relatedness is referring to the statistical likelihood that two 
organisms share a genetic allele relative to the average frequency of the allele in the 
population.25 The qualitative takeaway of Hamilton’s Rule is to describe how altruism can 
be an inherited behavioral strategy for two organisms that share a common ancestor. 
Although this explains most altruistic behavior in nature, as well as nepotism in humans, 
the theory does not expand on how humans are capable of making tremendous sacrifices 
for a group member who has no genetic relatedness to them. In order to understand this 
phenomenon, we will attempt to recreate our hunter-gatherer past to evaluate what social 
and environmental pressures would have enabled humans to act cooperatively and develop 
a moral conscience.   
As it vastly disputed among anthropologists whether we can accurately  
recreate the social environment of our hunter-gatherer ancestral past, anthropologists  
such as Christopher Boehm believe it is possible with the ethnographies of over  
339 modern hunter-gatherer societies observed in various environments.26 An ethnography 
is a scientific description of a group of people or culture, primarily conducted by 
anthropologists to provide empirical data toward their understanding of different human 
societies. Out of those 339 ethnographies, Boehm examined 150 hunter-gather bands that 
most closely resembled our ancestral past and found one similarity that all tribes possessed: 
they all are highly egalitarian. Boehm states that, at a minimum, “all the active hunters 
(generally the adult males) insist on being seen as equal and that among themselves they 
tolerated no serious domination—be this in hogging vital food resources or in bossing 
 
24 Ullica C. Segerstrale, “Hamilton’s Rule: Biology,” in Encyclopedia Britannica, accessed August 13, 
2019, https://www.britannica.com/science/Hamiltons-rule. 
25 Richard McElreath and Robert Boyd, “Alturism and Fitness,” in Mathematical Models of Social 
Evolution: A Guide for the Perplexed (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2007), 71–97. 
26 Boehm, 76–78. 
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others around.”27 A member who gains status as a good hunter can be seen as a leader in 
the facilitating group consensus, but not necessarily as a maker of group decisions.28 These 
better hunters are expected to act with humility. If one were to “try persistently to intimidate 
or tyrannize their peers, or if they actually succeed in doing so, they are quite likely to be 
killed.”29 This form of deterrence is essential to understanding that all social creatures 
possess rank and status, which generally provides an individual a higher probability of 
acquiring community resources and reproductive opportunities over other members. 
However, this characteristic of social creatures does not mean that people seeking 
leadership positions or esteem from the group are consciously striving for sexual 
opportunities and resources. Instead, those that do not behave adaptively toward these 
positions of status have a decreased representation in the next generation, and their 
behavior is selected out.30 Therefore, there is two evolutionary pressures at play: the first 
is to climb the dominance hierarchy with behavioral patterns of assertion and aggression, 
and the second is to act with humility by demonstrating prosocial behavior toward  
the group.  
While these two acts in the right social setting can be compatible, there is generally 
a battle between two broad behavioral strategies (act selfishly vs. act altruistically), that 
will be key in understanding what makes us human. It is evident that many of our modern 
social structures rarely form this type of strict egalitarianism where we aggressively punish 
self-serving behavior, and explicitly promote prosocial behavior. Most modern 
organizations indirectly encourage selfish behavior by rewarding members who know 
“how to get ahead” and treat the work environment as a competition between coworkers. 
One theory that can help explain the problems that perpetuate the difference in these social 
structures is what psychologists Norman Li, Mark Van Vugt, and Stephen Colarelli refer 
to as the “mismatch hypothesis.” 
 
27 Boehm, 109. 
28 Boehm, 109. 
29 Boehm, 47. 
30 Gat, 206. 
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The “mismatch hypothesis” theorizes that because most of our brains’ adaptation 
occurred in the Pleistocene environment, the modern environment has created novel 
circumstances that we are ill-prepared for. This “adaptive lag” appears when the existing 
environment fluctuates quicker than the time needed for the psychological mechanisms 
within the human brain to adapt. An example of a psychological mechanism is our inherent 
interest in food that is rich in fat and sugar content. Such an adaptation would have 
reinforced one’s survival in the Pleistocene but can be a damaging to one’s health in the 
modern environment.31 If we are to apply the mismatch hypothesis to solving ethical 
organizational problems, we can see that due to the novel contextual complexities of our 
modern environment, it can be difficult for humans promote an organizational environment 
that aligns to our “natural” Pleistocene environment. Some of these modern organizational 
problems include job satisfaction/fulfillment, depression, leadership selection, and 
favoring of kin.32 Through this hypothesis, it can be reasoned that if leaders align their 
members’ lifestyles and organizational setting to resemble the social and physical 
environment of our Pleistocene ancestors, leaders can improve many negative aspects that 
plague our modern organizational atmospheres. Thus, to perform such a task, we should 
expect far more egalitarian behavior from a leader in the way they adjudicate member’s 
actions through punishment and rewards. In the form of egalitarian punishment, we would 
expect a leader to use their authority to punish any signs of self-serving boisterous behavior 
and ostracizing any form of laziness such as someone taking more than their fair share.  
For egalitarian rewarding, the leader would encourage acts of prosocial behavior where 
one’s contribution to the team is not only evaluated by one’s personal accomplishment in 
team tasks but also by one’s involvement in helping others. Therefore, with this “mismatch 
hypothesis” as a framework for accomplishing ethical change, let us analyze more of the 
Pleistocene past and turn to the psychological functions that evolutionary theorists believed 
to help form our sense of morality.  
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Evolutionary psychologists John Tooby and Leda Cosmides argue that our 
adaptation for coalition psychology was a prerequisite for our adapted sense of morality.33  
This coalition psychology was built out of selective pressure from both intergroup and 
intragroup conflict, which manifested itself in war, politics, group psychology, and 
morality.34 They argue that our moral psychologies developed to enhance a group’s rapid 
recruit of members with a common interest, and to have an effective enforcing mechanism 
of punishment. Humans created “moral games” to structure social interactions and 
payoffs.35 Tooby and Cosmides argue that these “moral games” evolved with our higher 
cognitive abilities. The first-order moral games encompassed an individual moralizing 
right and wrong in reciprocal exchanges between two parties of similar or equal power. 
While second-order games introduced the elements of multiple parties where an individual 
needed to navigate the multitude of values and interests of others while expressing their 
own.36 In forming a group consensus through different social opportunities of bargaining 
and negotiation, the coalition would enforce a set of values that could be actualized into 
“moral projects.” Due to the cross-culture variation we see today, these “moral projects” 
show tremendous diversity (from the Aztec ritual of cannibalism to the Jainism prohibition 
of killing insects) that they seem unlimited in number. Tooby and Cosmides believe we 
derive these “moral projects” by evaluating responses rather than specific content 
domains.37 In other words, people generally hold moral values based on how strong the 
coalition signals a particular value and not on some intrinsic higher moral reasoning (like 
justice or allocation). However, this is not to say culture can completely short circuit the 
more primitive moral instincts we hold as a social species. Anthropologist Christopher 
Boehm found through his ethnographic studies that it is universal among all hunter-
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gatherer communities to demonstrate moral outrage over anyone “killing another group 
member without proper cause, or theft or cheating within this primary group.”38 
With these limitations in mind, even if a group consensus coerced one to follow the 
defined rules, Tooby and Cosmides believe there has to be a greater psychological 
mechanism that promotes group coordination. Because humans have inherent opposing 
interests, values, social relations, loyalties, capabilities, and knowledge, they believe 
humans adapted a mental coregistration. This coregistration allowed different coalition 
members to experience parallel inputs to enhance any task that required mental 
coordination (which is many humans tasks in our ancestral past).39 The theory argues that 
the larger number of shared experiences by individuals will encourage a greater level of 
coordination and cooperation between the two members. Thus, this adaptation for coalition 
psychology naturally extends into our capacity for a moral psychology through shared 
coregistration of group values and rules.  
Finally, scientific research supports that through gene-environmental interaction, 
our moral sentiments increased in highly predictable stages. In Christopher Boehm’s book, 
Moral Origins, he discusses how early infants demonstrate sympathetic feeling for others 
that is followed by a general sense of rules as they age. By the time these children arrive in 
grade-school, they have “highly self-conscious shame reactions, which includes blushing 
when in the wrong.”40 As humans reach adulthood, there is an expected stage where adults 
internalize community values in order to most effectively orient themselves to the 
perceived group values. This stage is what we also refer to as having a conscience. Boehm 
argues that a “fitness-optimizing conscience” would most likely act with some moral 
flexibility to not be at a competitive disadvantage (by taking society’s rules too literally), 
but also recognize that one should never bend some rules for it would have lasting 
reputational damage if discovered.41 Furthermore, Boehm finds that this conscience is 
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adapted to allow a member to connect with the rules in an emotionally “positive way that 
makes you identify with them, feel ashamed when you break them, feel self-satisfied and 
moralistically proud when you live up to them.”42 Therefore, through the social-
environmental pressure to cooperate and coordinate with the group most effectively, the 
individual adapted a recognizable moral meter (or conscience). That moral meter would 
have evolved to internalize and support the community’s values, through deliberate and 
unintentional efforts. These moral games, moral projects, coregistration and fitness-
optimizing conscious would have allowed humans to form their moral community. 
Although these moral communities would differ throughout the world based on their 
social-environmental circumstances, Boehm also discovered through his ethnographies, 
that all groups frown upon and punish “murders, undue use of authority, cheating that 
harms group cooperation, major lying, theft and socially disruptive sexual behavior.”43 
Therefore, although our morality may differ in personal beliefs or within our moral 
communities, there is a consistent pattern of what we may consider as our moral 
conscience. That is to say that based on the current evidence of our moral origins, morality 
is not complete relative, and should not be treated as such. Thus, we must find a way to 
properly define morality.  
When describing how to articulate morality, evolutionary psychologists start from 
the premise that evolution will tend to favor an organism whose norms are somewhat 
plastic and able to develop and abandon norms based on their utility to the organism.44 
These organisms can be anything from bacteria to humans. In Robert Wright’s book, The 
Moral Animal, Wright follows this logic by arguing that our plastic minds are shaped by 
cues in the social-environment. We analyze these cues to understand what assets and 
liabilities we bring to table, in order to create an “optimal behavioral strategy” that will 
most likely perpetuate our genes.45 Wright proposes that this “optimal behavioral strategy” 
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is not something we consciously do. Instead, it is a function of our brain to act as a device 
that can win arguments to not only convince others, but for our own self-deception of the 
perceived truth.46 He reasons, that moral sentiments were an evolutionarily selected 
adaptation that increased one’s conviction of their moral rightness to be correct in the eyes 
of the group. Although this may be a cynical view of morality, Wright asserts that despite 
the illusion natural selection plays on us, this sense of morality is a benevolent illusion that 
attributes to our moral codes of conduct. These forms of moral conduct are what “makes 
us mindful of the welfare of people other than family and friends, raising society’s overall 
welfare.”47 In other words, Wright believes that morality is an illusion that is socially 
constructed to make members of the community far more prosocial.  
Additionally, in the study of morality, Tooby and Cosmides suggest that it benefits 
individuals of equal power to have their preferences moralized and to be privately non-
Kantian (that is not rule abiding) but publicly Kantian (act in accordance to rules that one 
encourages to spread) in this moral game. They argue that “such an adaptation would make 
the local moral consensus more favorable to realizing the individual’s preferences, even 
though sometimes such outputs are functionless or fitness reducing.”48 The purpose of this, 
from a fitness-optimizing perspective, is to even out the playing field. If one is to take 
societies rules to literally, they will be at a genetic disadvantage. It would rather be fitness-
optimizing for a human to behave with some moral flexibility, where bending the lesser 
rules may be worth the potential costs of being discovered, while recognizing that there are 
rules that should not be cross, for what follows would be dire consequences.49 Boehm, 
refers to this as an “Alexandrian” opportunistic type conscience where one will calculate 
(through predictable social reaction from peers) what they can get away with, while 
maintaining a decent moral reputation.50 However, because there is evidence to suggest 
that our moral psychologies maintain an anti-hypocrisy circuit, an opportunistic type 
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conscience is something leaders should recognize and avoid. The reasons are two-fold. 
First, subordinates will feel a sense of moral disgust for the hypocritical and blatant act of 
manipulation, and second, any action a leader takes that fails to meet the moral precedent 
(either through their own actions or failing to correct a subordinates actions) will have an 
effect in deflating the support and willingness for group members to follow an established 
rule.51 Thus, if a moral community is to be maintained, a leader should truly be held to a 
higher ethical standard. 
Therefore, although most evolutionary sciences views morality as a socially 
constructed illusion, we have evolved to adopt moral sentiments for this illusion in order 
to promote cooperation and prosocial norms within our ingroup. However, calling morality 
an illusion, is to say that our taste of “spicy” is an illusion. Morality evolved to be a part of 
our senses, just as our taste buds have.52 This sense of morality is what sets us apart as a 
species. Trust and cooperation, with the backing of our moral sentiments, forced members 
to conform or prepare to be exiled from the group. We are all decedents of those who went 
along and promoted this social experiment. Such a view of morality can actually be a 
positive, for it allows us to socially construct an ingroup that we treat with moral 
compassion well beyond the boundaries of our friends and family. Thus, from an 
evolutionary perspective, ethical valorous action is a member acting prosocially toward 
other group members by performing tasks that are individually fitness reducing for the 
benefit of the community. Throughout this chapter, we will use prosocial, virtuous, and 
ethical behavior interchangeably to define the same moral character we strive to perform.  
C. OUR ORGANIZATION CONSCIOUSNESS  
In order to understand why humans will act in a fitness reducing manner for the 
group’s wellbeing, and maintain/encourage particular moral sentiments within the group, 
I will analyze what organizational and individual pressures leaders can apply to influence 
such behavior. One theory that evaluates human cooperation and morality at the 
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organizational level is the theory of gene-culture coevolution. Proponents of the theory 
believe that human norms, institutions, and collective action all evolved through a dual 
process of both genetic and cultural development.53 To understand this theory and its 
implications, we must first recognize how these theorists define norms and institutions. 
Norms, are mental representations individuals acquire through some form of learning (thus 
are not innate), and aim to allow humans to evaluate others’ motivations, expectations, and 
actions. Institutions are self-reinforcing bodies that converge individual norms and arise 
through group-level interactions, decisions, and learning.54 Therefore, institutions are 
interconnected with the individual norms acquired and expressed by its group members. 
With these definitions in mind, I will explain how these mutually reinforcing bodies 
constitute the bedrock of how humans maintain social cooperation and moral sentiments. 
The first step is considering how we establish norms.  
There are several ways individuals attain these norms using learning strategies or 
heuristics that allow people to adapt to the institution they find themselves in. There are 
two general strategies an organism can perform when engaging in survival within its 
environment. The organism can act through a trial and error process, known as individual 
learning, or it can engage in social learning by observing what others do. As both 
evolutionary strategies have their advantages, many evolutionary scientists believe that our 
social learning abilities have permitted us to spread and thrive more than any other 
species.55Although social learning is not unique to humans, we are the only species that 
have become cultural learner, where an individual or group provides an ‘improvement’ to 
the original artifact or practice. Cultural learning can be compounded over time by a 
continuous modification to create a “rachet effect.”56 These forms of learning or heuristics 
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include, direct observation of the perceived cost and benefit, copy the most successful, 
copy the majority, and average what the most prestigious people do.57 Economists have 
shown that such strategies are quite rational and fitness maximizing when information 
about a cost benefit behavior are noisy or error-ridden.58 People tend to blend information 
from multiple models with what they find useful within the context of their situation. To 
understand this cultural learner, evolutionary thinkers Peter Richerson and Joe Henrich 
have concluded that an individual will generally pay attention to fitness-relevant 
information that is useful and is compatible with existing cultural beliefs and norms.59 
Furthermore, it is documented that social groups will have a cultural leaning bias toward 
cues of conformity (what is everyone else doing) and prestige (what are the members with 
the greatest reputations doing).60 Therefore, if a leader wants to establish prosocial norms 
within the group, they must attempt to persuade others through these general heuristics. 
However, these heuristics are not the only thing that motivates members to maintain group 
norms.  
Significant studies in neuroscience and neuroeconomics have demonstrated that 
behaving in a manner that is accustom to local norms through cooperation, contribution, 
and costly punishment stimulates an individual’s brain reward circuit and anticipated 
reward circuit in the same manner as receiving direct cash.61 These studies also indicate 
that it actually requires overriding an automatic cognitive response in order to break a 
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social norm, and that humans naturally follow their group established norms.62 One theory 
proposed by cognitive science to explain this is the social heuristics hypothesis. The 
hypothesis asserts that with the internalization of social norms, humans will intuitively act 
upon those norms (primarily in cooperation) and that a deliberate, reflective process must 
occur for humans to act against those norms in any effort to achieve better results. Due to 
the long term reputation advantage of acting intuitively toward these norms, it is highly 
context-dependent for humans to defect and act against the established norms.63 The 
implications for this theory is that we can expect a member of the ingroup to act morally 
unconsciously unless there is a contextual opportunity for some reflection and action 
against the group’s moral norms. With their target audience in mind, leaders can use the 
conforming majority, the prestigious minority, and the social heuristics hypothesis to 
maintain established moral sentiments. Although these tools are essential in preserving the 
agreed-upon moral etiquette, we have yet to answer how a leader can personally influence 
prestigious members to change a culture to promote more reliable prosocial behavior. One 
tool a leader can exploit through organizational design is directing the institution to 
reinforce these desired prosocial norms.  
Institutions possess significant incentives to have individuals conform to a given 
set of principles through a combination of reputation, signaling, costly punishment, costly 
rewarding, and forms of cultural learning.64 Therefore, the first thing an institution must 
establish is a well-functioning reputational system. Prominent evolutionary thinker Richard 
D. Alexander believes this reputational system involves a process where everyone in the 
social group is consistently assessed for acts of indirect reciprocity. Examples of these acts 
in the modern context include, donations to charity, giving blood, heroism in combat, and 
assistance to a fellow citizen. Although these acts may associate some form of risk, through 
potential death or injury, when publicly praise (or gossiped about), these individuals 
generally enhance their status and prestige, thus earning a reputation as a decent social 
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trader.65 However, it is important to note that a well-functioning reputational system may 
require to be limited in size in order to sustain this costly behavior.66 Anthropologist Robin 
Dunbar has been one to investigate what size a human group would be effective at 
maintaining its reputational system. By analyzed several primate social group sizes based 
on ecological, demographic, and cognitive variables, Dunbar concluded that humans are 
designed to maintain formal interpersonal relationships with approximately 150 
individuals. These relationships are ones in which each party can expect to ask for a favor 
and provide one in return.67 With the advent of language, humans began to “gossip” and 
create highly accurate expressions of public opinion that calibrated anyone’s social 
reputation within the group. Gossip became used as social control for punishing acts of 
deviance that would otherwise go unnoticed.68 It would also act as a highly useful tool for 
a member to understand the group’s moral consensus. Although most of the social settings 
we interact in today’s modern context exceed this number, interpersonal relationships with 
members from several other groups can allow a leader to seek the reputational standing of 
an individual through the age-old gossip routine.  
The second tool an institution can use to signal the group’s moral consensus is 
preaching. From warlike to peaceful foraging societies, quantitative research indicates that 
charismatic preaching to promote sympathetic generosity or what is commonly known as 
the “golden rule” is practiced in all these societies.69 Therefore, preaching must have some 
effect in persuading members into what is morally right. It is a way for the institution to 
signal righteous behavior. Additionally, anthropologist Mark Moffett proposes that another 
form of social control observed in all cultures is shared symbolism. As another form of 
institutional signaling, these shared symbols of identity allowed humans to create stable 
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social systems that provide them with ingroup/ outgroup distinctions and identifies a 
“hierarchy of degree of intimacy with which people know one another.”70 Exposure to 
these symbols increases social harmony and coordination while providing a sense of group 
loyalty and belonging. This sense of loyalty to the group allows tribal societies to engage 
one another as if they were fellow kin. It is also hypothesized that there is a psychological 
need for an outgroup to identify and maintain the labeling of the ingroup.71 These innate 
tendencies are universal in all human cultures. We use signs such as “crosses, uniforms, 
peace signs, oaths, and other indicators” to demonstrate not necessarily who we are, but 
what we believe we are.72 However, with the formation of any cohesive group, there is 
always a dark side to dividing the world into ingroup and outgroup membership, which can 
explain the most horrendous acts in human history. Anthropologists have observed these 
xenophobic tendencies in contemporary hunter-gatherers (and almost all human groups), 
where moral sentiments only apply within the group, and outsiders are treated as sub-
human. This may account for how outgroup members “may be killed with little 
compunction”73 as morality is applied differently to intergroup conflict. Therefore, if one 
were to betray the group, they will most likely be rejected membership and as a form of 
costly-punishment, be treated as an outsider.  
The third tool an institution can provide is a costly-reward. If the institution can 
show that a long-term favorable gain through rewards provided over the years will 
outweigh the immediate short-term reward that an individual seeks, the institution can 
incentivize those that adhere to the established norms.74 In the ancestral past, these forms 
of rewards included prestige and status, as one demonstrates consistent prosocial behavior 
through a lifetime of effort toward the group’s needs. An example of this in the modern 
context is the U.S. military’s pension for twenty-years of honorable service. 
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Finally, institutions have tremendous ability to establish the cultural norms of the 
group and promote them through cultural learning. An example of this is the sense of justice 
in an “honor culture” versus a “dignity culture.” Experiments in collective punishment by 
social psychologists Fiery Cushman, A. J Durwin, and Chaz Lively indicated that 
individuals see themselves as morally responsible for actions of a member within their 
group in honor-based system. “Honor cultures” generally evolve when there is a lack of 
central authority, and the use of collective punishment deters future wrongdoings from both 
individual violators of established norms and outside groups. This system sharply contrasts 
our notions of moral psychology in contemporary western societies (or dignity culture), 
where each individual is solely held responsible for their actions.75 These psychologists 
expect that many of our ancestral societies promoted this sense of “honor culture” due to 
their ecological circumstances. Although there are costs associated with implementing an 
“honor culture,” the benefit is that if the institution establishes the right set of cultural 
norms, there will be a greater adherence to the norms for fear of “letting down” one’s 
members and loss of a suitable reputation. Therefore, if we were to develop institutions 
with aspects of: a well-functioning reputational system that systematically promotes 
prosocial preaching; shared symbols of identity; a willingness to reward its member for 
long-term service and loyalty; and aspects of honor cultures (group accountability); we can 
expect a stronger consensus of a common moral establishment. However, the institution is 
not the only system that can contribute to an individual’s calculus in performing prosocial 
norms. Given the evolutionary context of morality described above, we must finally 
analyze what leaders can personally do to establish and promote a moral consensus. 
D. MORAL LEADERSHIP IN ACTION 
Leaders’ actions have often been the essential tools to change public norms and 
moral sentiments. When discussing leaders, I am referring to “individuals who have 
differential influence within a group over the establishment of goals, logistics of 
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coordination, monitoring of effort, and reward or punishment strategies.”76 Although there 
are general characteristics of leaders, it is important to differentiate what a leader may 
represent in our modern societies (what we will refer to as a Large-Scale Society) compared 
to our ancestral societies. Although Small-Scale Societies (SSS) is describing the size  
of a political organization, to include horticulturalists and pastoralists, I will describe these 
SSS in reference to hunter-gather tribes which roamed in small bands during the 
Pleistocene. Leadership in SSS tends to be egalitarian, less institutionalized, and far more 
situational to the context of events that unfold.77 Evolutionary psychologists, to include 
Pinker, Tooby, and Cosmides, believe that humans evolved decision rules for aligning our 
behavior as we changes through various stages of reproductive status, levels of energy, 
social reputation, group structure, interpersonal, and intergroup threats.78 These decision 
rules guide how we view others in the context of local social hierarchy. Several scholars 
have argued through the “mismatch hypothesis,” that the decision rules within the human 
psyche for establishing leadership and followership roles were programmed for a SSS, not 
the novel LSS we see today.79  
The mismatch can create problems where leaders are potentially selected for their 
ability to lead in a SSS and not an LSS organization. Such selection would create situations 
where leaders are ill-suited for high-level position in an LSS organization and subsequently 
make poor decisions. Additionally, this may have the inverse effect of bureaucratically 
assigning members into positions of authority where they lack leadership qualities to 
tactfully convince followers to listen to their directive. These leadership qualities in a SSS 
are trustworthiness, generosity, social connections, and fairness due to the wariness of 
exploitation in an egalitarian society. In these societies, individual authority is often earned, 
not received.80  
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The Tsimane forager-horticulturalist of Bolivia demonstrate an example of 
leadership in a SSS. The leaders in this society tend to rise during collective action 
problems to include fishing events and raids. Although leaders tend to be taller, strong, and 
more socially connected than their peers, their coercive power is limited. Usually, leaders 
will experience ostracism from the group if they attempt to intimidate other members into 
action. Therefore, in these egalitarian societies, leaders must find other ways to create a 
consensus among its members.81 This consensus may be formed by passive influence, 
persuasive reasoning, or ascribing approval through social connections and kin.82 Because 
leaders in SSS do not possess the top-down authority expected in LSS, they must genuinely 
persuade their followers to take action. While this may be inconvenient and time-
consuming, this consensus-building improves buy-in from the group, as they feel that they 
are part of the decision making process.  
Additionally, in these SSS, members are far more connected with their group’s 
identity through shared customs, rituals, and language. In modern societies, humans can 
“maintain an identification with ethnics groups, workforces, clubs, religions, social classes, 
political parties,”83 which further complicates an individual’s loyalty toward the 
competing groups within their social circumstances. Thus, individuals in LSS will have 
their social identity change to the context-dependent circumstance they find themselves 
in.84 These social conditions create an extremely difficult challenge for leaders to manage 
in a LSS. Because people find themselves in different social settings, it is most likely that 
their sense of morality will also adapt to their social context. This feature is mainly due to 
our inherent need to be part of the ingroup as social creatures. Fitting within one’s moral 
community is vital to our fitness, where a good social reputation maximizes one’s success 
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within a group.85 Therefore, in understanding when an individual fails to meet the moral 
expectation of the group, one must observe the different social communities that member 
may be a part of; and how a virtuous act of prosocial behavior may enhance their social 
reputation in one but not the other.  
Although such differences exist between effective leadership in SSS versus LSS, 
there are still several characteristics that will make a successful leader in both societies. 
Choosing such a leader will help prevent aspects of the “mismatch hypothesis” between 
our evolved decision-rules for selecting leaders and those who are generally chosen to 
climb the bureaucratic chain. These common characteristics include: experience, earned 
prestige, cooperative, persuasive, socially-connected, prosocial, physically dominant, and 
selfless.86 Because these leaders have a stronger say in the groups established norms 
through a prestige bias, they have an enhanced ability to create a conformity bias for 
members to act prosocially and morally toward one another. With an understanding of the 
established culture and environment they find themselves in, these leaders will have an 
overwhelming influence of the groups moral sentiments and create buy-in to the system of 
reward and punishment for good and bad behavior. 
E. CONCLUDING THOUGHTS 
Evolutionary theory provides a new lens on how we form and define our sense of 
morality and maintain this morality through the use of our organizational and leadership 
involvement. Although it does not paint a complete picture of what morality is in our 
modern social settings, it sheds light on the foundation of our moral aperture by evaluating 
our moral beginnings and the formation of our sense of morality. The next chapter will 
discuss ethical leadership from a moral psychology standpoint. And finally, the last chapter 
will provide a summary of recommendations from both chapters into a comprehensive 
leadership toolkit for ethical leadership.  
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III. MORAL PSYCHOLOGY 
With an understanding of how we form, define, and maintain our moral beliefs from 
an evolutionary perspective, the following chapter will use the analytic lens of moral 
psychology to further our comprehension of how leaders can influence our moral 
judgments into action for ethical change in an organization. As described before, moral 
psychology is an interdisciplinary field that takes aspects of both philosophical theories 
and human psychology to observe and analyze human thought and behavior in an ethical 
context.87This academic field draws on both empirical findings in the social sciences and 
conceptual debates in the philosophy of ethics.88 As these fields contain a plethora of 
scholarship and data, extensive debate occurs within both disciplines. This thesis will 
remain focused on how moral psychology views moral motivation and action.  
However, I cannot describe moral motivation without articulating what morality is. 
Although the meta-ethical debate of how we express morality has existed since the dawn 
of recorded history in both western and eastern philosophy, that dispute is beyond the scope 
of this thesis.89 Instead, due to its alignment with the guiding principles and evidence 
derived from evolutionary thinking, I will use the pluralist approach to describe morality. 
With that said, to answer the thesis question of how leaders influence ethical decision 
making within an organization, I will divide this chapter into three sections. First, this 
chapter will articulate the viewpoint of the pluralist as a framework for understanding 
ethical decision making. Second, this chapter will discuss the research on how we form our 
moral judgments and engage the intellectual debate on what motivates individuals into 
moral action. Finally, this chapter will describe the psychological studies that demonstrate 
effective ways to motivate individuals morally. Following this chapter, I will provide final 
recommendations on what leaders can do to effect ethical behavior from the combined 
research in evolutionary theory and moral psychology.  
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A. MORAL PLURALISM 
Moral pluralism is the view that our values, virtues, and ethical principles are 
fundamentally diverse, and thus one cannot channel them to a single description of 
morality. That means that a variation in moral judgments can exist not only between 
societies but also between different cultures, groups, individuals, and within oneself. 
Therefore, moral dilemmas are a real thing when deciding between two moral truths. 
Although there are multiple moral truths, moral pluralism agrees with moral realism, that 
“we can make objectively valid judgments about values.” Where pluralists differ from the 
realists, is by prescribing that such judgments are not always compatible.90 On the other 
end of the spectrum, a moral relativist believes that “the truth or justification of moral 
judgments is not absolute, but relative to the moral standard of some person or group of 
persons.” Thus, from their perspective, ethical standards are entirely relative and derive 
from one’s culture or society.91These relativists question if there are any ethical truths that 
can be universally described as fundamental to all of humanity. Although the evidence to 
support each meta-ethical view has its merits (and societal implications for viewing the 
world in such a manner), examining that evidence is beyond this thesis. To reasonably get 
to the heart of our discussion of how leaders influence ethical behavior, I will use a pluralist 
framework to explain what it means to be ethical. That is to say that the existence of moral 
truths is real, but these truths have a plurality to them in which an individual may emphasize 
one more than others based on the complex social environment one finds themselves in. 
Therefore, following this logic, we must ask, what are these moral truths that the pluralists 
speak of? 
Social psychologist Jonathan Haidt investigated this question and discovered a way 
to articulate human morality from this pluralist standpoint categorically. Described in his 
book The Righteous Mind, Haidt created a moral matrix that represented this moral 
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plurality that can be observed throughout the world and the sense of righteousness each 
group has of their own behavior. Using the analogy of a tongue with five different taste 
receptors, Haidt depicted how human morality is analogist to a cuisine: 
it’s a cultural construction, influenced by accidents of environment and history, but 
it’s not so flexible that anything goes. You can’t have a cuisine based on tree bark, 
nor can you have one based primarily on bitter tastes. Cuisines vary, but they all 
must please the tongues equipped with the same five taste receptors. Moral matrices 
vary, but they all must please righteous minds equipped with the same six social 
receptors.92 
Teaming with applied social science researcher Craig Joseph, these men conducted 
an extensive examination of research in the academic fields of anthropology, evolutionary 
psychology, and social psychology to formulate a moral matrix. The purpose of this 
investigation was to create a universally applicable moral matrix with the cross-cultural 
variation of moral beliefs in mind.93 Haidt’s Moral Foundations Theory (MFT) with five 
moral receptors and the adaptive challenges, triggers, emotions, and virtues that are 
associated with these receptors is presented in Table 1.94 
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Therefore, with this moral pluralist model as a way to understand how we cross-
culturally construct our moral organizations, I will now focus on the research as to how we 
realize and act upon those moral judgments.  
B. MORAL JUDGMENTS AND MOTIVATION 
With Haidt’s Moral Foundation Theory as a framework in understanding how our 
different moral truths manifest themselves into our explicit and implicit moral values, this 
section will evaluate the literature in moral psychology on moral judgments and action. 
This evaluation will be done by first articulating how we formulate our moral judgments 
in this framework, and second, by examining the theories that explain how we are 
motivated to take moral action from the realization of these moral judgments.  
Moral judgments are anything that has moral significance and motives people to 
express, promote, and evaluate others (and themselves) on expected behavior.96 Although 
we may not realize it, we are continually making moral judgments, while others are morally 
evaluating us. Such assessments may be as mundane as failing to tip a waitress, or as 
dangerous as driving under the influence. It is all part of our daily routine as social 
cooperators. One theory that provides a useful way to understand how we develop these 
moral judgments is the Dual-Processing Model. Based on extensive research in psychology 
and cognitive science, the Dual-Processing Model argues that two general areas of the brain 
are engaged during a moral decision. One which is personally based (the brain region 
associated with emotions are increasingly active), and the other is impersonal (the brain 
region associated with controlled cognitive processes). Below is an example of a moral 
dilemma in which experimenters are activating both processes in subjects.97  
Enemy soldiers have taken over your village. They have orders to kill all 
remaining civilians. You and some of your townspeople have sought refuge 
in the cellar of a large house. Outside, you hear the voices of soldiers who 
have come to search the house for valuables. Your baby begins to cry 
loudly. You cover his mouth to block the sound. If you remove your hand 
from his mouth, his crying will summon the attention of the soldiers who 
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will kill you, your child, and the others hiding out in the cellar. To save 
yourself and the others, you must smother your child to death. Is it 
appropriate for you to smother your child in order to save yourself and the 
other townspeople?98  
In this study conducted by moral psychologists Joshua D. Greene, Leigh Nystrom, 
Andrew Engell, John Darley, and Jonathan Cohen, these psychologists found that subjects 
usually deliberated for a long time before providing an answer, and that answers were split 
somewhat evenly as to whether to kill the baby. What was insightful from the study was 
that those who chose to “smother the baby,” generally a consequentialist judgment, had to 
override their emotional response that guides most of us to “not smother the baby,” or make 
a rule-based judgment.99  
Neuroimaging supports these claims through the discovery that in an extremely 
difficult scenario such as this one, subjects demonstrate increased neural engagement in 
both the anterior cingulate cortex (ACC) (which is associated with quick behavioral 
responses), and even greater engagement in the dorsolateral prefrontal cortex (DLPFC) 
(linked with cognitive control), while attempting to solve this moral dilemma.100   
As a necessary background for those unaware of the field normative ethics within 
the academic discipline of philosophy, a consequentialist judgment is usually a conscious 
wellness maximizing response, while a rule-based judgment is usually an intuitive 
prohibition of certain types of harm.101 Also referred to as utilitarianism and deontology, 
in short, these normative ethical theories believe that a utilitarian will support the result 
that betters the overall outcomes for those involved, while a deontologist will define 
morality by rules or right and wrong, such as “don’t kill people.”102 It is a moral question 
of ‘do the ends justify the means?’ or vice versa. It is essential to know these perspectives, 
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for many psychological and philosophical studies use these ‘thought experiments’ as an 
evaluative tool of our moral framework.103 
Another psychological study specifically investigated response times in moral 
judgments and confirmed these findings of how we formulate our moral judgments. In this 
study, psychologist Jonathan Baron and Burcu Gurcay, analyzed the subject’s response 
time to moral dilemmas by asking subjects “whether it is right to kill one person in order 
to save five others,” which is another common thought experiment.104 Once again, by 
using the normative theories of utilitarianism and deontology, the authors expected that if 
the response were to kill, it would fall in the lines of utilitarianism, while if they refrain 
from killing, it would be a deontological response. The experiment demonstrated that 
people were “default interventionist,” where deontological responses occurred more 
immediately (largely spark by emotions), while utilitarian response generally took more 
time (assuming that the subject corrected their intuitions by a more reflective process). The 
psychologists believe the experiment supported three conclusions. One that a utilitarian 
response often requires more time, two, that cognitive distractions and time pressure affects 
these reflective responses, and three, that instructing the participant to be reflective or 
intuitive affects their responses.105 Finally, a study by behavioral neurologist Mario 
Mendez found that subjects with deficits in emotional processing, known as frontotemporal 
dementia (FTD), show behavioral changes that progress into morally questionable actions 
such as inappropriate sexual advances, physical assault, and stealing. Thus, this study 
demonstrated that the ability to make immediate personal based moral decisions seemed to 
be affected by this neurological condition; which is a behavioral pattern similar to that of 
a sociopath.106    
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The implication for the Dual-Processing Model is that we can override our moral 
intuitions through thoughtful, rational discussion, and critical thinking. By having 
members discuss certain moral dilemmas, where our moral intuitions are promoting one 
action (that can be interpreted as morally just in the short term), and moral reasoning 
producing another (weighing in the second, third order effects), we can come to a greater 
consensus of what right looks like. With the evidence of this model, we will use the Dual-
Processing Theory to comprehend how we can effect ethical change. Therefore, with an 
understanding of how we realize our moral judgments, we will now examine the debate as 
to how we motivate individuals into moral action. 
In The Moral Psychology Handbook, moral psychologist Timothy Schroeder, 
Adina Roskies, and Shaun Nichols describe four familiar theories that attempt to explain 
what motivates us into moral action. These four theories are (1) instrumentalist, 
(2) cognitivist, (3) sentimentalist, and (4) personalist. Below is a brief description of  
each theory.107  
4. The instrumentalists follow the premise that beliefs on how to fulfill pre-
existing desires, develop moral motivation. Achieving these intrinsic 
desires are for their own sake. Examples of these desires include, the 
wellbeing of others, pleasure, and to accomplish the will of God. The 
instrumentalists contend that once the right condition presents itself, this 
intrinsic desire will motivate an individual into action.108 This theory 
becomes troubling when the evidence in neuroscience supports a different 
conclusion. Specifically, in cases where patients received discrete lesions 
on the motor basal ganglia (the region that conducts an internal evaluation 
of information), there appears to be a lack of desire and motivation. Thus, 
the brain’s rewards system is not the only location where desires are 
triggered and expressed.109 
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5. The cognitivists affirm that occurrent beliefs of what action would be right 
is what motivates us into moral action. Thus, the conscious deliberation of 
a moral belief produces moral action. They argue that it is our understanding 
of what right looks likes that motivate us into action rather than any 
particular desire. Although desires exist, they play a lesser role as data 
points that one considers in acting upon an ethical decision for the morally 
mature individual.110 This theory is similar to the rationalist model that 
claims that moral reasoning is a developmental progression that occurs 
through the application of moral principles or rules to a situation. Thus, by 
extension, our moral judgments elicit our moral behavior.111 Although we 
will reject this theory because the details of our neural wiring demonstrate 
that humans do not always favor the power of reason over their intrinsic 
desires, it is still an important aspect to how we are morally motivated to 
take action.112 Therefore, we will examine the cognitivists theory of moral 
reasoning later in this chapter.  
6. The sentimentalists argue that certain emotions or sentiments perform a 
causal role in moral behavior. The combination of several different 
emotions manifests themselves into moral action. Actions cannot constitute 
as being morally motivated if these sentiments do not exist. An example of 
one of these sentiments is compassion.113 Similar to this belief is the 
intuitionists. Intuitionists claim that what we refer to as reasoning is deeply 
flawed. They argue that what we account as truth is far more of a 
justification for our behavior and judgments due to our inherent self-interest 
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and reputational biases.114 Therefore, we must account for our deep 
subconscious intuitions when understanding moral motivation. Although 
emotions have been studied to provide bodily change through release of 
neurochemicals such as dopamine, the sentimentalist picture is not a 
complete representation of our neurophysiology.115 However, analyzing 
moral intuitions is an important part in understanding our moral matrix, and 
therefore, will be examine these intuitions later in this chapter. 
7. Finally, it is the personalists who do not focus on a specific mental state but 
provide a holistic approach to understanding our moral motivation. 
Following the Aristotelian prescription of virtue ethics, the personalists 
believe that the development of good character is fundamental to what 
drives us to moral action. They state that good character “involves 
knowledge of the good, wanting what is good for its own sake, long-
standing emotional dispositions that favor good action, and long-standing 
habits of responding to one’s knowledge, desires, and emotion with good 
action.” This knowledge of the good does not need to be from some explicit 
theory but more likely to be recalled through a variety of moral heuristics 
(do not lie, generosity is good) and a learned sensitivity to the context one 
finds themselves in. Long-standing cognitive, emotional, and behavioral 
dispositions (i.e., habits) give rise to our personality and character.116 
Although the personalists provide the most complicated explanation of 
moral motivation, most moral psychologists agree that it reflects the best 
theory of moral motivation based on the wealth of scientific evidence, to 
specifically include recent discoveries in neuroscience.117 
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Although, there is extensive detailed research as to why the personalists theory best 
reflects the neurophysiology of moral motivation, the research is quite complex and beyond 
the scope of this thesis. To articulate this neuroscientific research in layman’s terms and 
something we can attempt to comprehend, I will describe what the current research 
indicates. Neurophysiological data supports that our perceptions and beliefs are realized by 
both higher cognitive centers of the brain, which evaluate implicit knowledge of the good 
and explicit knowledge of heuristics, and emotion centers (the amygdala) of the brain, that 
assess reward signals, thoughts, and desires. These neurological networks communication 
information to an internal evaluation process (the motor basal ganglia) to form habits. This 
area of the brain releases moto commands that manifest themselves into behavioral 
action.118 From this explanation, we can understand that there is a complex web of 
information processes’ that produce moral motivation. 
I will conclude that while the personalist’s theory does not settle whether it is our 
subconscious intuitions or our rational thinking that provides more weight to our moral 
character and behavior, the results of that debate does change the way in which leaders can 
influence moral behavior. The important takeaway from this theory, is that it possible to 
influence both centers of the brain to engage in moral action we desire. Therefore, through 
the consideration of our emotional dispositions, defining what is good, and evaluating our 
short-term and long-term desires, we can create habits that align with virtues behavior.119 
The last section of this chapter will now articulate different psychological studies that 
attempt to examine and influence these factors that contribute to our moral judgments  
and actions.  
C. MORALS IN ACTION 
With a pluralist framework as our meta-ethical foundation, a theory that explains 
how we develop our moral judgments, and a general consensus of how we are morally 
motivated to take action, this final section will introduce psychological studies that 
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demonstrate methods in which we may engage our rational and intuitive moral processes. 
By engaging these moral processes, we will have a strong influence on member’s habits 
and moral character. To best explain these methods, I will divide this section on moral 
action into three sub-sections. First, I will discuss how to leaders can change ethical 
behavior using moral reasoning. As this has been one of the more well-discussed subjects 
among philosophers, I will keep this section limited by explaining the most popular model 
for moral reasoning and expand on the conversation by adding a potential alternative to 
that model. Second, I will focus on clarifying what moral intuitions are. As this has become 
a more recent subject of interest among moral psychologists, we will dive into the research 
that attempts to understand our moral intuitions (as they are often difficult to detect and 
analyze). Finally, we will dedicate the last sub-section in providing a potential approach to 
engage these moral intuitions from a leadership standpoint. However, before we examine 
these conscious and subconscious moral processes’, the reader must be aware that due to 
the roll in what the personalists refer to as our moral character, it is often a complex 
combination of these influences that form and shape our moral psychologies. Therefore, 
for the most significant effect, these methods should be used simultaneously and in 
conjunction with one another.  
1. Ethical Rational Decision Making 
In order to direct ethical change in an organization, a leader must learn the art and 
science of moral reasoning to help guide his/ her members to the logical conclusion of 
appropriate ethical behavior. One can describe moral reasoning in many ways. However, 
philosophers generally articulated moral reasoning in the three dimensions of “practical/ 
theoretical; internal/ external, and, when internal conscious/ unconscious.”120 Keeping 
with the theory of the Dual-Processing Model, I will focus on moral reasoning that is 
practical, external, and consciously driven. That is to say, reasoning that supports the 
logical discussion of practical ways to cause change. Such moral reasoning should help 
provide an answer to our ethical problems within an organization.  
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One popular method of moral reasoning among philosophers is the deductive 
model. The deductive model follows the assumptions that: 
1. People believe the conclusions of deductive arguments.  
2. That believing the premises will cause a person to support the 
conclusion. 
3. That the premises are independent of one another, and that some 
premises can be constituted as morally neutral.  
4. The argument must fit the classical view of concepts, which is the 
definition in terms of sufficient conditions.121 
Although, many of these assumptions may be confusing to a reader who is not 
familiar with the philosophical logic behind the deductive model, a deeper explanation of 
this logic is beyond the scope of this thesis. Rather, we will focus on how the deductive 
model was applied in psychological experiments to demonstrate its applicability. An 




• (P1) Cheating is always morally wrong except in extreme 
circumstances. 
• (P2) This act is cheating. 
• (P3) This circumstance is not extreme. 
Therefore, (C) this act is morally wrong.122 
Developmental psychologist Lawrence Kohlberg introduced the deductive model 
into his famous experiments on children and adolescence. Kohlberg created a structural 
development model (1981), where he assessed different stages of moral reasoning by age. 
As a psychologist, Kohlberg was a maverick of his time by bridging the gap between 
psychology and philosophy. Much of his work is considered the foundational research to 
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the discipline of moral psychology.123 In Kohlberg’s studies, Kohlberg examined subject’s 
ability to give abstract reasoning on hypothetical moral dilemmas. Generally, if the subjects 
were more educated and older, their reasoning would exhibit greater complexity. Kohlberg 
describes the highest stage of moral reasoning as postconventional, as it rarely appeared in 
subjects without a post-secondary education.124 Below is the list of Kohlberg’s six stages 
of moral reasoning: 
• Level A: Preconventional 
• Stage 1= Punishment and Obedience 
• Stage 2= Individual Instrumental Purpose 
• Level B: Conventional 
• Stage 3= Mutual Interpersonal Expectations and Conformity 
• Stage 4= (Preserving) Social Order 
• Level C: Postconventional and Principled Level 
• Stage 5= Prior Rights and Social Contract or Utility 
• Stage 6= Universal Ethical Principles125 
Although these studies are interesting in how our reasoning becomes more 
sophisticated through age and education, philosophers Gilbert Harman, Kelly Mason, and 
Walter Sinnott-Armstrong believe there is little empirical evidence to suggest that in most 
real situations, we participate in this type moral reasoning and form our moral judgements 
in such a manner.126 Therefore, with much skepticism in the deductive model, we must 
look at other ways in which moral philosophers and psychologist can improve our moral 
reasoning.  
One strategy proposed by cognitive-behavioral psychotherapist Donald Robertson, 
is to combine the evidence-based clinical practice of cognitive behavioral therapy (CBT) 
with the ancient texts of Stoic philosophical therapy.127 Robertson believes that the 
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importance of using both the ancient scripts and the modern therapeutic techniques can be 
articulate in the following five reasons described in Robertson’s book The Philosophy of 
Cognitive-Behavioral Therapy (CBT): Stoic Philosophy as Rational and Cognitive 
Psychotherapy.  
1. Early psychotherapists of the 20th century can trace the origins of 
their theories to the ancient therapeutic exercises of Socratic 
philosophy. Thus, psychology has always been an extended body 
of knowledge from philosophy in understanding the human 
condition.  
2. The qualities of virtuous character and the conception of the 
philosophical “sage” provide a means to model excellence and 
guide our moral actions. 
3. Concepts of affirmation, autosuggestion, and verbal coping 
statements used in CBT are surprisingly similar to the rehearsal 
and memorization of sayings and maxims in philosophy.  
4. The use of mindfulness meditation within CBT is analogist to the 
“mindfulness of our own faculty of judgment, and the internal 
dialogue, in the ‘here and now’” preached by Stoics. 
5. And finally, resolving faulty thinking or cognitive distortion in 
CBT relates to “the objective analysis of our experience into its 
value-free components, by suspending emotive judgments and 
rhetoric,” which is  popular among the stoics.128 
 
Robertson argues that this application of philosophy and psychology allows the 
wisdom of these disciplines to proliferate beyond the halls of our academic institutions and 
encourages the “ordinary person” to apply these concepts “to their own problems in the 
form of individual counseling or group sessions with a quasi-therapeutic style.”129 
Although, I encourage the reader to examine the different writing of Stoicism and how they 
relate CBT, that discussion is beyond the scope of this thesis. Instead, I will focus 
specifically on the last point Roberson makes and examine the therapeutic techniques 
clinical psychologists use to resolve cognitive distortions and how such techniques relate 
to moral reasoning.  
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CBT is a form of psychotherapy that assists patients in treating disturbing emotions 
by replacing those emotions with healthy, rational, and proportionate ones. The term 
cognitive-behavioral, identifies that therapists are using some form of rationalization to 
target peoples’ beliefs, intuitions, and emotions.130 This form of therapy recognizes that 
our brains are a complex combination of interactions between these systems. With over 
325 clinical trials and 16 separate meta-analysis studies on CBT, this form of treatment has 
become one of the leading techniques in treating anything from anxiety disorder to chronic 
pain.131 Below is an example of steps a cognitive therapist may take when treating a patient 
with depression.  
1. To monitor his negative automatic thoughts, or cognitions. 
2.  To evaluate the relationship between thoughts, feelings, and 
actions; 
3. To carefully evaluate the evidence for and against his distorted or 
maladaptive cognitions; 
4. To generate alternative cognitions and to substitute them for the 
negative ones; 
5. To identify and modify underlying dysfunctional assumptions and 
beliefs which predispose him to negative automatic thoughts.132 
Although CBT is clinically used to treat criminal misbehavior through Moral 
Resonation Therapy,133 in my research, I have yet to find any application of CBT to our 
specific topic of changing ethical behavior within one’s organization. It seems we must fill 
this gap through future studies in moral psychology and its application. While there is no 
data to prove my point, I hypothesis that because this is a leadership problem, leaders are 
not going to possess the experience or tools of a psychotherapist. At least in the military, a 
leader has the power to refer a subordinate to a therapist after he or she has engaged in a 
morally questionable act (ex. DUI). However, if for example, a leader notices a subordinate 
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with a potential drinking problem where their decision making skills are in question, a 
therapist may be both invasive and counterproductive if the subordinate has yet to commit 
any inappropriate act. This therapy may be seen as invasive, for people do not like to be 
psychoanalyzed (at least formally) in an involuntary manner when they have done nothing 
wrong; and counterproductive, for most people will likely refuse to let a therapist observe 
their inner thoughts, and thus prevent the therapist to treat their potential issue. Therefore, 
in my humble opinion, if a leader wants to be proactive rather than reactive to morally 
questionable behavior, the techniques of CBT will work best if a leader disguises it as 
something else. Through opportunities of engagement, such as one-on-one mentorship 
sessions or general social events, a leader can get the ethical pulse of their subordinates 
and provide course corrections by using the methods of CBT. By providing an environment 
that is relaxed, informal, and open to discussion, a leader can hear the ground truth and 
engage in discussion over potential cognitive distortions. Although I have yet to see any 
clinical trials that tests of this form of moral reasoning, I believe it can achieve tangible 
results as it has worked well within the field of psychotherapy in solving many peoples’ 
psychological problems. In concluding this discourse of moral reasoning, I will now 
attempt to unpack the complex idea of what is describe as our moral intuitions. 
2. Understanding Our Moral Intuitions 
One of the more challenging tasks a leader must face in changing an organization’s 
ethical climate is influencing its members’ moral intuitions. Moral intuitions are moral 
beliefs that are strong, stable, and immediate to access.134 They remain hidden from  
our conscious selves through fast, reliable heuristics that help us through everyday 
situations.135 Based on the intuitionists’ perspective in moral motivation, moral intuitions 
must exist before any form of moral reasoning, and moral deliberation must serve a social 
function rather than an epistemic desire for moral truth. These moral deliberations include 
“managing social impressions, convincing others to adopt one’s view about a moral issue 
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and rationalizing one’s own moral intuitions to oneself.”136 Although this is a highly 
debated topic within the Association for Moral Education (AME), that debate will not be 
discussed in this thesis.137 Instead, this section, will articulate the social psychological 
studies that demonstrate the potential existence of these moral intuitions. Following  
this section, we will end this chapter of moral psychology on ways to shape these  
moral intuitions.  
In a set of studies performed by social psychologists Peter Ditto, David Pizarro, and 
David Tannenbaum, the authors conducted extensive research in the examination of our 
moral intuitions in the form of biases.138 Based on the intuitionist model, they 
hypothesized that we morally judge in a preferred direction by first, “adjusting perceptions 
of an actor’s accountability for a moral act,” and secondly, “by altering the principles 
brought to bear in evaluating the morality of the act itself.”139 That is to say, that humans 
are motivated to make moral judgments that fit their preconceived ideological moral 
framework. To analyze and trigger these motivational moral biases, the authors used 
Haidt’s general description of the moral positions of American liberals versus American 
conservatives. Using the Moral Foundation Theory, Haidt describes how social  
liberals tend to be concerned with the principles of care/harm and fairness/cheating;  
while social conservatives generally emphasize loyalty/betrayal, authority/subversion, and 
sanctity/degradation within their moral matrix.140 Below is the description of these studies 
that demonstrated our moral biases.  
First, the researchers wanted to examine how individuals adjust the actor’s level of 
responsibility for a morally permissible act. When referencing ‘responsibility,’ the authors 
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used the criteria widely supported by normative philosophical and legal theorists that claim 
that we should hold individuals morally responsible if “that act should have been caused, 
controllable, and intended by the actor.”141 The first study tested the hypothesis that 
American political conservatives would act upon this bias by viewing American service 
members in a positive manner, based on ingroup loyalty (or patriotism). Once again, the 
purpose of the study was to demonstrate how prior moral dispositions would affect how 
individuals viewed the same information and judged the moral intentions of the actors. 
Below is a description of the hypothetical scenarios provided to participants.  
Participants received one of two military scenarios. Half of the participants 
received a scenario describing American military leaders deciding to carry 
out an attack to stop key Iraqi insurgent leaders in order to prevent the future 
deaths of American troops. The other half read about Iraqi insurgent leaders 
deciding to carry out an attack to stop key leaders of the American military 
in order to prevent future deaths of Iraqi insurgents. In both cases, it was 
explicitly stated that the attackers (whether American or Iraqi) did not want 
nor intend to cause civilian casualties, but in both cases the attack did. After 
reading the scenario, participants were asked to indicate whether the 
military leaders had intentionally harmed the innocent civilians, and to 
indicate their political ideology on a standard 7-point liberal-conservative 
scale.142 
The results indicated that liberal participants did not differ on intentional judgments 
based on the nationality of the subject. However, conservatives on the other hand, were 
more likely to view the death of civilians as deliberate if it was caused by an Iraqi compared 
to American service members. Though both scenarios clearly articulated that the innocent 
deaths were unintentional, over 77% of participants who viewed the death of innocent 
civilians as intentional, used the military leader’s foreknowledge as a justification. 
Additionally, 95% of those that defended the leader’s decision for collateral damage, 
referenced the leader’s “goal-directed mental states” as a moral explanation.143  
Other studies on moral judgments by psychologist Alan Leslie, Joshua Knobe, and Adam 
Cohen, have confirmed that we are more likely to judge an act intentional when seen as 
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morally bad, but unintentional when seen as morally good.144 Therefore, the first moral 
bias we must be aware of is that we are likely to change the perception of the actor’s 
accountability to the act to fit our moral framework.  
The second bias studied by these psychologists was to observe whether our 
ideological intuitions motivationally influenced our moral reasoning. This is to ask if we 
situationally alter our moral principles due the context of the scenario to support our moral 
intuitions. For clarity, “principles” are thought to be “foundational rules that, while not 
always fully universal, are at least widely applicable across a defined set of situations.”145 
Using the previous discussed normative theories of deontology and consequentialism, the 
researchers created two experiments where the subjects endorsed one of the principles 
based on their response to the moral dilemma. The idea was to ‘trigger’ subjects to provide 
a bias response based on their intuitions of moral righteousness.146 Below is a description 
of the first scenario provided by the study: 
 
College students were present with a modified version of the trolley/ 
footbridge dilemma, in which the morality to pushing one man into the 
tracks to save the lives of many others must be assessed. Our key 
modification was to include in the scenario extraneous information that we 
believed would evoke differing affective reactions depending on the 
student’s political ideology…We therefore decided to vary the race of the 
characters in the trolley scenario (subtlety and between-subjects) to see 
whether this would influence participants’ judgment concerning the 
appropriate moral action. Specifically, half of the participants were faced 
with a decision about whether to push a man named ‘Tyrone Payton’ onto 
the tracks to save ‘100 members of the New York Philharmonic,’ while the 
other half had to decide whether to push a man named ‘Chip Ellsworth III’ 
onto the tracks to save ‘100 members of the Harlem Jazz Orchestra.’ It 
should be clear that our goal was to lead our subjects, without using actual 
racial labels, to infer that in the first case their decision involved whether to 
sacrifice one African-American life to save 100 that were mostly White, and 
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in the second case whether to sacrifice one White life to save 100 that were 
mostly African-American.147 
With a ‘overall consequentialism index’ and a ‘standard liberal-conservative scale’ 
as quantitative variables for statistical analysis, the results indicated that this racial 
manipulation had a significant effect on the subjects’ moral action.148 First, participants 
had a general tendency to approve of a consequentialist rationalization for sacrificing a 
man with a typical White name over a typical African-American name. However, what was 
revealing, was when adding a regression line of political orientation, conservatives showed 
no effect, while liberals had a far a higher propensity to assess Chip’s sacrifice in 
consequentialist terms over Tyrone’s sacrifice.149 This study was replicated several times 
with different audiences and different moral dilemmas (“lifeboat” dilemma) to support the 
same conclusions.150 The authors believe that they manipulated American liberals’ general 
bias to a sensitivity toward racial inequality in the perceived negative outcome of 
sacrificing a African-American man over a White man.151 In a second study, these authors 
replicated these biases in American conservatives. Through the same military scenario 
described previously, the authors results indicated that conservatives were far more likely 
to take a consequentialist approach to justify American soldiers harming civilians over 
Iraqi insurgents harming civilians for the same objectives.152 This likely demonstrates 
conservatives’ sensitivity toward ingroup loyalty.  
From this research, the authors believe that our selective reliance on these moral 
intuitions is due to the fact that there are often conflicting standards of appropriate action 
(i.e., rock in a hard place), and our motivational biases are difficult to detect by others and 
ourselves (i.e., self-deception). They argue that this research supports the premise our 
moral conclusions are more like “hired gun attorneys” looking to direct judgments for our 
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preferred outcomes, rather than a “Supreme Court Justice” who analytically adjudicates 
the objective “truth.”153 That is to say that we have motivated moral reasoning that 
“describe situations in which judgements are motivated by a desire to reach a particular 
moral conclusion.”154 However, the studies also showed that when people were made 
aware of their inconsistencies to a standard principle in a timely manner, the responses 
changed.155 The psychologists discovered this finding in an alteration to the racial study. 
If a liberal participant received the Chip scenario before receiving the Tyrone scenario, the 
participant was more likely to remain consequential toward both Chip and Tyrone with a 
correlation index score of .98. These responses were thus more consequential toward 
Tyrone than the previous liberal responses (where participants only received one 
scenario).156 It seems the need for consistency can override this bias impression.  
Thus, the point of this research is not to pontificate why each political ideology 
response to these moral dilemmas differently, but rather demonstrate that our motivational 
moral biases effect our moral reasoning. This is due to our moral intuitions, which follow 
our ideological preferences, that stems from the challenges of group living.157 Under the 
premise that our morality serves more as a social function than a truth-seeking device,158 
the authors hypothesize that our moral judgments express themselves this way to engage 
in the best forms of cooperation, coordination, and trust within our ingroup.159 They argue 
the best way to combat these biases is to first be aware of their existence, and second, 
promote a diverse ideological organization where moral matters are openly questioned and 
critiqued by colleagues for their judgmental biases. This method of approach can be 
quantitatively supported by several studies in social psychology, that indicates that there is 
an inherent tendency for us to view our own opinions as objective while viewing others’ 
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judgments as influenced by biases.160 Therefore, with an understanding of how our moral 
intuitions express themselves, I will now describe ways leaders’ can shape these moral 
intuitions.  
3. Engaging Our Moral Intuitions through Identity 
One way to understand how people are morally motivated to take action based on 
their moral intuitions is what sociologists refer to as the identity theory. The identity theory 
proposes that the individual may have multiple identities in which these respective 
identities are tied to either 
1. A group or category that a person is a member of in society (ex. 
Christian) 
2. A role that a person occupies in society (ex. parent) 
3.  A set of characteristics that distinguish the person as different from 
others in society (ex. principled)161 
These sociologists believe that certain identities are activated situationally when a 
person needs to act in that capacity (ex. parent), while other identities may stay active 
continually as a ‘core’ identity. With different commitments and allegiances, these 
identities can constantly be shifting and aligning as the environment changes.162 
Sociologists have conducted dozens of empirical studies through surveys and laboratory 
experiments to prove the validity of this theory.163 However, research in moral identity as 
a ‘core’ identity has been limited to the moral meanings of fairness and caring, and thus, 
does not include the other moral foundations within Haidt’s model (loyalty, authority, 
sanctity).164 Because of this limitation and the true complexity of morality, it is difficult 
to use the identity theory as a way to articulate and encapsulate one’s moral identity.  
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Rather, this theory can be utilized by leaders in a way to make membership to an 
organization (a group/ category), a viable ‘core’ identity that influences a member’s 
behavior and action. If we use Dual-Processing Model, we can assume that a member will 
develop a consistent heuristic, or automatic process, to act under with the perceptions, 
behaviors, and situations that provide the same meaning to their identity standard. 
Sociologist Jan Stets offers that we can shape this automatic process by providing an ‘input 
error,’ or disturbance, where the “individual perceives that others do not see them in a way 
that is consistent with the meaning in their identity standard.”165 This ‘input error’ forces 
the individual to break their automatic process and engage in deliberate reasoning for an 
alternate behavior that follows the perceived identity standard.166 We may then use of tools 
of moral reasoning to convince a member of their expected identity standard. However, 
changing the identity an individual, often requires convincing by more than a boss 
providing an “input error.” What is stronger, is the influence of the group in shaping the 
individual’s identity.  
Based on several studies in social psychology, group identity has a substantial effect 
on how we engage in moral action. Demonstrated in the studies on self-determination, 
social psychologist Decharms, Deci, and Ryan, found that an actor is intrinsically 
motivated to commit to action if they have a sense of power over their circumstance. 
Whether this sense of control is an illusion or an actual choice, people are increasing 
motivated to enhance their performance when accomplishing a task they chose to do.167 
This is probably why a sense of empowerment and buy-in among subordinates in vital any 
successful enterprise. However, this finding generally holds in Western individualistic 
cultures. In what cultural anthropologists refer to as collectivist cultures, where identity is 
more of a distinction between ingroup and outgroup versus self and others, people are far 
more motivated to meet the demands and expectations of the social ingroup rather than the 
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self.168 This collectivism would work well in an organization where one does not always 
have the option to give its members a choice on policy matters. In a culture of collectivism, 
a leader can influence a group to take considerable intrinsic action for what the social group 
demands, rather than for their personal benefit. Furthermore, this research has shown that 
these interdependent members prefer a provided decision when the socially acceptable act 
is unclear. Such a decision eliminates the burden of identifying the socially sanctioned 
decision and increases a sense of belonging and loyalty for following the clearly articulated 
rule.169 Consistent with this theory, cross-cultural studies have indicated that these 
collectivist cultures usually have a duty-based system. This system requires an individual 
to be morally obligated to their social duties in order to achieve ingroup social harmony. 
Additionally, these cultures emphasize the interpersonal obligation of the individual to 
their identity and the importance of contextual sensitivity.170 Although anthropologist 
Richard Shweder describes the difference of this collectivist versus individualist cultural 
paradigm based on geographical (country/ regional) location, further research indicates that 
these differences are not bound by geography alone.171 
Social Psychologist Jonathan Haidt conducted a research experiment with 360 
subjects to examine Shweder’s theory by observing the moral difference of certain groups 
based on location (US and Brazil), social class (high and low), and age (children and 
adults). The experiment was designed to test how subjects distinguished moral violations 
(a girl shoves a boy off a swing) versus what some may refer to as conventional violations 
(a boy refusing to wear a uniform to school). The initial hypothesis was that a more socio-
centric society such as Brazil would see most conventional violations as moral violations, 
while an individualistic society (the United States) would distinguish the two. Although 
there was a significant difference between the two countries, the largest effect size was 
surprisingly in the social classes. Participants who were well-educated in both countries 
were far more similar to one another than their lower-class neighbors. The difference was 
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that the lower class were more likely to judge the conventional violation as a moral 
violation.172 In terms of understanding the cultural differences in morality, the 
implications of this study are two-fold. For one, having superficial commonalities (wealth, 
profession, age, marital status) may actual bring a better moral understanding of one 
another; and two, the cross-cultural difference within our own society (or our delta) may 
be greater than the differences in geographically separated societies. Therefore, forming an 
organization that follows the tenets of collectivism is still possible in a W.E.I.R.D. 
(Western, Educated, Industrial, Rich, Democratic) society, such as the United States.173 
Although a collectivist culture is a complex array of customs, norms, traditions and 
institutions, social psychologist studies on collectivism have indicated that by investing in 
both vertical and horizontal relationships, tradition, stability of the ingroup, and group 
goals, an organization can promote the tenets of collectivism.174  
D. CONCLUDING THOUGHTS 
Therefore, by changing the organizational environment to where one can easily 
identify their “core” identity to that of the group and fostering an emphasis toward the 
social duties expected in a collectivist culture, a leader may have a strong influence on its 
members’ moral intuition and ethical behavior. Promoting this ‘core’ identity and 
collectivist ethos to the moral standard one wishes to uphold may be easier said than done. 
But by first understanding the power our moral intuitions and the details that create those 
intuitions, we can achieve our goal of moral persuasion. Additionally, by engaging in the 
prescribed forms of moral reasoning, a leader can help mold any cognitive distortions 
subordinates may have to the ethical standard the organization expects. I believe with the 
expanding literature on these forms of moral intuition and reasoning, the more we will 
realize that the personal decisions and actions leaders make have always had a lasting effect 
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of discouraging and incentivizing specific behavior that creates the ethical climate of that 
organization. Thus, solid performing leaders of moral character are fundamental to the 
principles that any group wishes to stand for. Now in the final chapter of this thesis, I will 
articulate a framework that leaders can use to promote this principled organization, 




With an understanding of how leaders influence their ethical climate to the 
standards and expectations of their moral community based on evolutionary theory and 
moral psychology, I will now summarize the points made throughout this thesis into 
practical actions leaders can implement. Although we should use overt moral reasoning 
with our CBT model to critically engage the logic behind our moral values, the focus of 
many of these recommendations are designed to influence our moral intuitions. Based on 
Haidt’s Moral Foundation Model, I have divided the recommendations under our five 
moral pillars. If we use our sensitivity to these pillars as a guideline to how we mold our 
moral intuition, we can create a better framework to engage the problem of influencing 
these intuitions. Additionally, within each pillar, I have split the suggestions into what 
actions leaders should implement at the personal level and the organizational policy level. 
This divide is important, for we must recognize that it is both the interpersonal and 
established group rules/ norms that affect how individuals calculate their appropriate action 
and behavior. It is with the establishment of these norms to which individuals will use 
several heuristics (cost/benefits, copy the most successful, copy the majority, etc.) to make 
an informed decision as a cultural learner. Lastly, I have limited each category to the most 
influential three recommendations discovered within my research. As there may be a 
mismatch between our modern and ancestral environments, these recommendations are 
designed to promote the moral community that we have been physiologically adapted to 
create. Although these moral communities can evolve into different forms (or cuisines) 
through the pluralist architecture of morality, the way we emphasize each pillar gives us 
the power to direct our moral community. Therefore, with the implementation of these 
recommendations, I believe a respected prestigious leader through earned authority will 
have a strong capability to shape their moral community to the highest ethical standards 
expected by that organization. 
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A. FAIRNESS/EQUALITY 
1. Individual Action 
• In regard to creating an environment that closely resembles our EEA 
(Environment of Evolutionary Adaptedness), treat every member with 
respect and dignity regardless of rank. 
• Although competitive human nature can divide an organization, foster an 
environment where the competition for status is reflected by those who 
demonstrate the most prosocial behavior.  
• Punish any signs of cheating or laziness as it will undermine the 
community value of fairness due to our sensitivity to free-riders. 
2. Organizational Policy 
• When time permits, allow members to overtly (vote) or covertly (survey) 
express which members demonstrate the highest consistency of prosocial 
behavior.  
• Punish nepotism as it gives the benefactor an undeserved advantage over 
others and thus undermines fairness within the organization. 
• Promote a diverse ideological organization where we can reflect on our 
motivational biases through humble leadership and engaged membership.  
B. HARM/ CARE 
1. Individual Action 
• Award medals and forms public recognition to those who act prosocially 
through self-sacrifice and fitness reducing tasks. Also encourage prosocial 
behavior through individual positive feedback.  
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• Punish those who lack effort towards group goals and demonstrate overt 
self-serving behavior. Punishments may include ostracism, demotion, 
negative feedback, and firing.  
• Take advantage of our anti-hypocrisy circuit by demonstrating to people 
their inconsistencies in a timely manner.  
2. Organizational Policy 
• Encourage a Pleistocene environment where members have the time to 
take care of their psychological and physiological needs through leisure 
time, workout periods, proper rest, and health coaches.  
• Demonstrate that the organization is a family by engaging in costly-
rewarding. This costly-rewarding includes long-term benefits for 
dedicated membership (pensions) and acts of assistance when members 
are troubled, regardless of temporary loss of productivity and output.  
• When promoting leaders, be willing to sacrifice some level of 
performance for those that demonstrate good moral character. As this may 
be difficult to judge through quantitative results, leaders must evaluate 
these quality characteristics through personal observation in long-standing 
habitual acts of prosocial or virtuous behavior.  
C. LOYALTY/ BETRAYAL 
1. Individual Action 
• Individuals will act with some moral flexibility for the lesser rules. 
Concern oneself with the rules that are associated with membership to the 
group. Emphasizing these rules will define what betrayal is to the 
organization. This emphasis can be accomplished by harshly enforcing 
such rules and establishing a standard punishment guideline. This 
guideline should be well-known and regularly discussed throughout the 
organization. Additionally, by following clearly articulated rules, members 
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will feel a sense of belonging and loyalty due to the pride one takes in 
following a rule that defines membership.  
• Create a coalition consensus of what are the group's ethical principles, 
through passive influence, persuasive reasoning, and ascribed approval by 
one’s social connections. 
• Be wary of our natural tendencies to have a cultural learning and 
conformity bias towards ingroup membership. These biases may have the 
power to undermine our ethical standards. 
2. Organizational Policy 
• Maintain a well-functioning reputational system (Dunbar number), where 
members move throughout the larger organization and know the 
reputation of others they have yet to meet through the age-old gossip 
routine.  
• These positive forms of gossip will create an environment where members 
are consistently assets for acts of indirect reciprocity.  
• Create aspects of both an honor and collectivist culture, where one will 
‘let everyone down’ if they do not hold to the standards and expectations 
of the group. These social pressures can be the greatest form of 
psychological punishment if the member strongly identifies with the 
group.  
D. AUTHORITY/ SUBVERSION 
1. Individual Action 
• Leaders should act with confidence and authority while also 
demonstrating a profound sense of humility. Authority should be earned, 
not received. If leaders keep the organization and its members their top 
priority, while encouraging input from subordinates when time permits, 
57 
they may accomplish this earned authority. Additionally, if a leader wants 
a subordinate to be truly committed to doing their job to their best ability, 
a leader needs to spend the time to genuinely persuade a subordinate of the 
importance of their job to the success of the organization.  
• Leaders should be held to a higher ethical standard, for they represent the 
foundation and integrity of the organization. Due to our anti-hypocrisy 
circuit, any ethical failures by a leader will have a downward effect of 
encouraging unethical behavior. 
• Individual autonomy and authority over one’s actions is an integral part of 
the cultural norms within W.E.I.R.D. (Western, Educated, Industrial, Rich, 
Democratic) societies. Use this norm to allow members to take ownership 
of their responsibilities (thus avoiding micromanaging) and use one’s 
authority when collective action problems arise.  
2. Organizational Policy 
• Promote leaders who demonstrate common characteristics of leadership in 
LSS (Large-Scale Societies) and SSS (Small-Scale Societies). These 
include experience, earned prestige, cooperative, persuasive, socially-
connected, prosocial, physically dominant, and selfless. 
• Through our prestige bias, the most well-respected members have the 
greatest capability to undermine ethical standards. Severely punish these 
prestigious members that stray from the established ethical standards by 
the group.  
• As leaders are expected to make policy decisions that may incentivize or 
discourage certain ethical standards, it should be encouraged for leaders to 
be reflective in their decision-making process. As we have learned from 
the Dual-Processing Model, our reflective responses take time. Leaders 
must engage in thoughtful, rational discussions where one weighs in the 
second and third-order effects for a policy decision. 
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E. SANCTITY/PIETY/TRADITION 
1. Individual Action 
• Allow individuals to establish shared customs, rituals, and language 
(colloquialisms) that create a strong sense of group identity. 
• Allow the most prestigious members to preach what it means to be a 
member of the community (especially in times of ethical failure). 
• Encourage discussion of what right looks like and what the community 
stands for. An example can be a simple vignette of a member who has 
committed a substantial sacrifice for the group and how their character 
represents the positive ideals of the moral community. 
2. Organizational Policy 
• Encourage uniforms, oaths, and insignia that identify group membership 
to the organization. Make a tradition out of earning and maintaining these 
shared symbols of meaning. 
• Moral values will be largely based on how strongly the coalition 
emphasizes certain rules. This emphasis is overtly observed by how 
members hold each other accountable for their actions and behavior.  
• Make membership to the group a ‘core’ identity where one creates a 
collectivist culture in which members feel morally obligated to their social 
duties. Provide an ‘input error’ for those members that need to change 
their ethical behavior.  
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